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University of Pretoria 
6 Main Characteristics/Elements of a Successful and Workable 
Business Rescue Model for Consideration in the South African 
Context 
As can be seen from the excerpts from the UNCITRAL Guide referred 
to in par 4 above, there appear to be a number of common characteristics 
that underlie a successful and workable business rescue model. Although 
the mechanics of these characteristics appear to differ in form and 
substance in each jurisdiction, there is nonetheless a certain commonality 
that applies to their application. Where appropriate, potential problems 
that may be experienced with these characteristics in the South African 
context, will also be discussed. 
In addition, under the discussion of each of these elements a number of 
options, suggestions and considerations will be included. 
6.1 Institutional Framework 
It is perhaps appropriate to commence a discussion of a new business 
rescue model by determining the institutional framework within which it 
is proposed to operate. This point was touched on in par 4.3, where it was 
pointed out that it has to be decided who will exercise control over 
business rescue proceedings. 
It is submitted that there are two important aspects to the supervision 
of a new business rescue model. Firstly, who will decide whether the 
business rescue model will apply, and secondly, who will exercise overall 
supervision as regards the actual business rescue process. 
6.1.1 Determining Entry to the Business Rescue Provisions 
6.1.1.1 Introduction 
The main decision that needs to be made here is whether a new business 
rescue model will be reliant on court proceedings, or whether it will be 
* Continued from (2004) 16 SA Mere LJ 263. This article has been adapted from a working 
document by the same author used at a workshop on business rescue at the University of Pretoria 
on 16 January 2004. 
** Blur LLB (Unisa) LLD (Pret), Associate Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, Faculty 
of Law, University of Pretoria. 
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possible to implement the provisions without recourse to the courts. It 
has already been pointed out that one of the reasons for the failure of 
judicial management is its reliance on court proceedings. It is therefore 
submitted that reliance on court proceedings for a new business rescue 
model could create the following potential problems: 
•	 Cost factor - court proceedings are invariably expensive, and in the 
South African context, where most businesses are small to medium 
business enterprises, it would defeat the object of the exercise if the 
expense involved is too high to ensure the participation of the 
businesses one is seeking to save. South Africa needs a cost effective 
business rescue model that can be applied as inexpensively as possible. 
•	 Time factor - court proceedings are not only expensive, but can also 
very often be subject to delays and postponements. Invariably speed 
will be one of the most important factors that can save a viable 
business, and unnecessary delays could defeat the very purpose of the 
business rescue provisions. 
•	 Expertise - while no one will dispute the efficacy of our High Courts 
and the quality of the judges appointed to the judiciary, it is debatable 
whether the bench has the necessary expertise in order to make 
business-orientated decisions such as those that may be required when 
implementing business rescue provisions. 
Conversely, if there is no court involvement the whole business rescue 
model may be open to abuse by a number of the participants. In addition, 
creditors and other interested parties, for example' employees, may need 
to seek protection or assistance from the courts if their interests are being 
eroded by the implementation of the business rescue provisions. 
It will probably also be necessary to introduce a system whereby a 
distinction is made between applications for business rescue by the 
debtor, and the possibility of an application being brought by one or 
more of the creditors. In the case where the debtor itself wishes to make 
use of the business rescue provisions, it seems appropriate that it should 
be able to do so without first having to approach the court. The debtor is 
fully aware of its own financial situation, and would be the best judge of 
when use needs to be made of the relevant business rescue provisions. 134 
However, the same cannot be said about a creditor who may wish to 
implement the business rescue provisions. Most creditors will probably 
only have scant information regarding the true financial affairs of the 
debtor, and this information may not be sufficient to bring a successful 
application for the implementation of the business rescue provisions. For 
this reason it would be appropriate that any person, other than the debtor 
134 It is submitted that an insolvent trading provision will be instrumental in encouraging 
debtors who are in financial strife to seek assistance in terms of the business rescue provisions. It is 
preferable that the debtor seeks assistance at an early stage in order to make the success of a 
business rescue more likely. 
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itself, who wishes to implement the business rescue provisions should do 
so by means of an application to court. This will also place the debtor in a 
position to resist such an application, thereby nullifying any abuse of 
proceedings by third parties. 
Although most creditors would probably follow the liquidation route 
where pending or actual insolvency is suspected, it is conceivable that 
there will be certain classes of creditors, such as the employees of the 
debtor, who may wish to have the business rescue proceedings 
implemented in order to protect their livelihood. 
In the United States,135 for example, both voluntary and involuntary 
business rescue proceedings (the so-called Chapter 11 procedure) are 
implemented by means of the filing of a petition, but this is merely a 
formality and is normally not subject to judicial consideration. 136 The 
courts can, of course, be approached in order to obtain relief, whether it be 
from the automatic stay or otherwise. In Australia business rescue 
proceedings are commenced by the debtor or the liquidator appointing an 
administrator. In the United Kingdom there are various options available 
in order to save businesses in distress. 137 However, in the United Kingdom 
the procedure closest to the American Chapter 11 procedure and the 
Australian voluntary administration procedure, is the administration 
order. The administration order is a court-driven procedure, and the court 
may only grant such an order if one of four objectives can be attained. 138 
6.1.1.2 Application for Business Rescue by the Debtor 
As stated above, it is submitted that a new business rescue model 
should provide for the implementation of the relevant provisions by the 
debtor without the debtor having to make an application to court. A 
commencement proceeding, such as the appointment of a business 
administrator or the filing of an application, should be sufficient in order 
to commence the proceeding by the debtor. 
In order to protect creditors and employees from possible abuse of 
business rescue proceedings by the debtor, it is submitted that this low 
entry level to the proceedings should be balanced by providing for 
opposition thereto by parties who allege potential prejudice or abuse. It is 
stated as follows by the UNCITRAL Guide: 139 
"125. It might be suggested that a relaxation of the commencement standard could invite 
abuse of insolvency proceedings ...Whether such improper use could arise is a question 
of how the elements of the reorganization procedure are designed, including the 
135 All references to the United States Bankruptcy Code are references to Title 11 of the United 
States Code (11 USC, 1978). 
136 See John Ayer & Michael Bernstein Bankruptcy in Practice (American Bankruptcy Institute 
2002; par 6.2 at 127. 
13 These are receiverships, administration orders and company arrangements. 
138 See Alice Belcher Corporate Rescue (1997) at 14-5, 151-5; and Vanes sa Finch Corporate 
Insolvency Law (2002) Ch 9. 
139 A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.70 (Parts I and 11). Both documents may be accessed at 
www.globalinsolvency.comjinsol/intinsolvencies/uncitral.html. 
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commencement standard, requirements for preparation of the reorganization plan, 
debtor control of the business after commencement and sanctions for improper use of the 
process .... [I]t may be desirable that the insolvency law focuses upon discouraging 
improper use rather than making commencement more difficult to the potential 
detriment of all eligible applicants.' 140 
6.1.1.3 Application for Business Rescue by Parties Other Than the 
Debtor 
In order to protect debtors from frivolous or malicious applications for 
the implementation of business rescue proceedings, I believe that such 
parties should be obliged to approach the court in order to do so. In 
addition, it would perhaps be a good idea to set a substantive standard 
that needs to be met in order to obtain relief in the form of a business 
rescue. This is the case in the United Kingdom where the court must be 
satisfied that the granting of an administration order is likely to achieve 
one of four specified purposes, such as a successful business rescue, an 
arrangement between the debtor and its creditors, or the more 
advantageous realisation of the debtor's assets than would be the case 
in liquidation. 141 
Considering the revised situation in South Africa regarding employees 
and the labour legislation that protects them, it would perhaps be 
appropriate that they be entitled to approach the court for relief where 
the debtor is experiencing financial difficulties, and the debtor itself has 
not implemented the business rescue provisions. In light of the fact that 
employers are already obliged to consult with employees when financial 
difficulties are being experienced, 142 this would tie in quite appropriately 
with existing legislation. 
6.1.1.4 Implementation of Business Rescue Provisions by the Court 
The final possibility that needs to be addressed here, is the court's 
implementation of the business rescue provisions in cases where 
applications for liquidation are brought. This does not necessarily entail 
the court deciding of its own accord that a business rescue rather than a 
liquidation should be implemented, but rather that anyone of the 
participants, including the debtor itself, may intervene in order to request 
the implementation of the business rescue provisions instead of the 
granting of a liquidation order. It is submitted that this possibility should 
be built into the system by linking the business rescue provisions to the 
liquidation provisions, and by making an order for the implementation of 
the business rescue proceedings one of the alternative orders that the 
court can make when considering an application for liquidation. 
140 See UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 in par 125.
 
141 See Belcher op cit note 138 at 14.
 
142 See s 197B of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.
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6.1.2 Overa\\ Superv\s\on of the Business Rescue Provtsions 
Considering the current institutional framework in terms of which 
insolvencies are conducted in South Africa, it seems appropriate that the 
Master of the High Court should perform overall supervision of business 
rescues. This is due to the fact that business rescue is an integral part of 
insolvency law, and the Master already supervises the administration of 
insolvent estates. The Master's role will be purely administrative in 
nature, and will not entail a great deal of new work (although it may 
entail the amendment of a few in-house structures and procedures). 
However, there is one aspect regarding the Master's current super­
vision that will need to be excluded or limited, namely the making of 
appointments. It is suggested that the Master should not be involved in 
the appointment of business administrators. This aspect is discussed in 
more detail below. 
6.2 Core Provisions of a New Business Rescue Model 
Under this heading the core elements of a new business rescue model 
for South Africa will be addressed. The ensuing discussion should not be 
seen to be, precipitating the content of what should be in a new business 
rescue model, but rather as points of departure that can stimulate debate. 
6.2.1 Commencing the Business Rescue Procedure 
6.2.1.1 Introduction 
Although the commencement of a business rescue procedure has been 
partially discussed under par 6.1 (institutional framework) above, the 
discussion here will concentrate on the mechanics of who may commence 
the procedure, and how. There are mainly three aspects that need 
consideration here. Firstly, in what manner and in which circumstances a 
debtor may enter the business rescue procedure. Secondly, in what 
manner and in which circumstances persons other than the debtor itself 
may bring about the implementation of the business rescue procedure, 
and thirdly, in what circumstances the court may implement the business 
rescue provisions. 
In deciding these issues there may be some policy decisions that need to 
be taken, especially where persons other than the debtor desire the 
implementation of the business rescue procedure. 
6.2.1.2 Commencement of the Business Rescue Proceeding by the 
Debtor 
As stated above, it is suggested that South Africa should elect an 
option for business rescue that will allow a debtor to enter business rescue 
proceedings without having to approach the court. The process must be 
as inexpensive and as swift as possible in order to ensure the best possible 
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prospect of the procedure succeeding. The Australian model appears to 
work extremely well where their voluntary administration procedure 
commences as soon as the debtor appoints an administrator. Apart from 
the nominated administrator accepting the nomination to act as such, 
there are hardly any formalities that have to be complied with. The effect 
of such an appointment is immediate, and results in the swift 
implementation of the voluntary administration procedure. 
In the South African context such a simple and swift procedure may be 
open to abuse by debtors, especially considering that the commencement 
of a business rescue proceeding will result in an automatic stay. It is 
probably a given that checks and balances will have to be built into this 
procedure in order to prevent abuse. The most effective manner in which 
this could probably be achieved is to provide for opposition (by means of 
formal court proceedings) to the commencement of the business rescue 
proceedings by parties who allege prejudice. This method has two distinct 
advantages. The first being the cost involved in such an application will 
prevent frivolous or vexatious opposition proceedings and secondly, the 
courts will ensure that there is a definite prospect of prejudice before 
preventing the business rescue proceeding from continuing. 
If it is accepted that the debtor itself should be able to enter the 
business rescue proceeding without recourse to the courts, there are a 
number of other issues that will need to be decided, namely: 
•	 How is the proceeding commenced? Is it commenced by the filing of 
some sort of notice or application, will it commence by the passing of a 
resolution by the debtor or its management, or will it merely commence 
by the appointment of an administrator by the debtor? 
•	 Which organ of the debtor should be authorised to commence the 
proceedings? For example, in the case of a company should the 
directors or the shareholders (or both) take the decision? 
•	 Should provision be made for third parties to oppose the implementa­
tion of the business rescue provisions? If so, how should this be 
provided for and on what grounds? 
However, if it is decided that the business rescue model should be a 
court-driven process, a commencement standard will have to be decided 
upon. 
6.2.1.3 Commencement of the Business Rescue Proceeding by 
Persons Other than the Debtor Itself 
It would appear that most jurisdictions only allow for a system of 
business rescue where the debtor itself can commence the proceedings. 143 
There are, however, some jurisdictions that also allow creditors to 
143	 See UNCITRAL Guide op eit note 6 in pars 126-31. 
~	 ~ 
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commence such a proceeding. 144 In the South African context the 
question needs to be asked whether or not creditors should be allowed to 
commence the business rescue proceeding in appropriate circum­
stances. 145 
One of the options available is that provision can be made for creditors 
to intervene in liquidation proceedings and attempt to ensure the 
implementation of the business rescue provisions at that time. This can be 
achieved with the assistance of the court in a controlled environment, 
which will protect the interests of all the participants. Another option is 
to allow creditors to implement the business rescue provisions by way of 
an application to court (in the absence of liquidation proceedings) where 
clearly stated commencement standards have been set. The United 
Kingdom's commencement standard may be helpful in this regard. 146 
Although it is not intended to discuss this aspect in any detail here, the 
question may be asked as to whether the time has not come in South 
Africa to treat employees as a special category of creditor in insolvency 
proceedings. Few will argue that employees are not merely creditors in 
the general sense of the word. They are an integral part of any business, 
and the human element that accompanies their presence in any business 
requires that they should be treated differently, especially in cases where 
they are about to lose their livelihood as a result of the insolvency of the 
business by whom they are employed. The many recent changes to South 
Africa's labour laws 147 reflect the importance that has been attached to 
employee rights generally, and the resultant protection of their interests. 
In this vein it is perhaps appropriate to ask whether the employees, as a 
group of persons integral to the business by whom they are employed, 
should not be given special rights when designing a new business rescue 
model. 
By way of suggestion only, employees could be accorded the right to 
initiate a business rescue proceeding or to intervene in liquidation 
proceedings and request the implementation of the business rescue 
provisions instead. Another possibility is that the employees' express 
permission be obtained prior to the debtor itself being allowed to initiate 
a business rescue proceeding. To a large extent employees already have 
similar rights regarding liquidation due to the fact that they must be 
consulted whenever a debtor is experiencing financial difficulties. 148 
144 Ibid. 
145 An important point made by the lJNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 in par 126 is that one of 
the objectives of a business rescue proceeding is to enhance the value of assets upon insolvency 
and thereby increase the return to creditors. For this reason it is 'desirable that the ability to apply 
not be given exclusively to the debtor'. 
146 See Belcher op cit note 138 at 14. 
147 For a critical discussion of the recent amendments to the Labour Relations Act and the 
Insolvency Act, see Andre Boraine & BPS van Eck 'The New Insolvency and Labour Legislative 
Package: How Successful was the Integration?' (2003) 24 Industrial LJ at 1840. 
148 See s 197B of the Labour Relations Act. 
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When deciding these issues, the following aspects will require attention: 
•	 Should creditors in the general sense of the word be allowed to initiate 
business rescue proceedings, or should this be limited to employees? 
•	 If creditors and/or employees are to be allowed to commence business 
rescue proceedings of their own accord, how is such a proceeding 
commenced? Should creditors only be allowed to initiate such a process 
as intervening proceedings in an application for liquidation, or should 
they be allowed to approach the court of their own accord for the 
implementation of the proceedings? 
•	 Should creditors be required to provide security for costs (of both the 
application and the business rescue procedure) where they have 
initiated such a proceeding? 
•	 If creditors are to be allowed to initiate the proceeding, what 
commencement standards should be set before the court may grant 
the order? 
•	 If employees are to be accorded special rights in regard to the 
commencement of, and intervention in, business rescue proceedings, 
how will these rights be accommodated? 
6.2.1.4 Commencement of the Business Rescue Proceeding by the 
Court when Considering an Application for Liquidation 
It has already been stated that it is desirable to create a link between 
the liquidation provisions and the business rescue procedure. However, 
the question that needs to be asked is whether the court may order the 
implementation of the business rescue provisions of its own accord, or 
should it only be allowed to do so upon the request of a participant, such 
as the debtor or a creditor? In addition, where the court does receive such 
a request, or where it does so of its own accord, what criteria (if any) 
should be set before the business rescue proceeding can be set in motion? 
Apart from the question as to whether a conversion from liquidation to 
business rescue should be built into the system, the question can also be 
asked as to whether the converse situation should apply, namely whether 
there should be a conversion provision from business rescue to 
liquidation. Very often it may be clear that the business rescue provisions 
will not or cannot achieve its objective. In such a case there should be a 
mechanism whereby the liquidation provisions can be implemented and 
the business rescue proceedings set aside. 
Although it is preferable that business rescue proceedings be instituted 
as early as possible, it is also conceivable that there will be businesses that 
can be saved at the time the debtor is already insolvent. In addition, if one 
considers that one of the aims of a business rescue model is to enhance the 
value of the assets in order to ensure a more significant payment to the 
I general body of creditors, then it makes sense for the courts to be able to order the implementation of the business rescue provisions where this can in fact be achieved. This will especially be the case when a specific 
1 
I 
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business can be sold as a going concern, thereby also ensuring the 
continuance of the existing employment contracts. 149 
Conversely, it must be borne in mind that there are specific provisions that 
have been built into the insolvency and labour laws to ensure that a liquidator 
can achieve the same result within the liquidation process. One should be 
mindful of applying business rescue provisions when the same or similar 
objective can be achieved with the use of existing liquidation legislation. 150 
Consequently, the following questions need to be addressed when 
deciding these issues, namely: 
•	 Should a link to business rescue be built into the liquidation provisions, 
allowing for a conversion from liquidation to business rescue? 
• Conversely, should business rescue proceedings contain a link in order 
t to convert business rescue to liquidation proceedings? 
t • When the conversion provisions from liquidation to business rescue 
and vice versa are applied, what criteria should be laid down before the 
e court may do so? 
s, • If the courts are to be allowed to initiate a business rescue of their own 
accord, what criteria should be set before it is able to do so? 
e	 6.2.2 Automatic Stay (Moratorium) 
While this is without question one of the main characteristics of a 
.n business rescue model, there are still various questions that need to be 
r, posed in this regard. Most jurisdictions appear to provide for a 
le moratorium in one form or another, although the scope of the stay and 
)r the length of time for which it operates appears to differ from jurisdiction 
;h to jurisdiction. The UNCITRAL Guide highlights the importance of a 
;h stay by making the following statement: 
y) 
'179. In reorganization proceedings, the application of a stay facilitates the continued 
n? operation of the business and allows the debtor a breathing space to organize its affairs, 
time for preparation and approval of a reorganization plan and for other steps such as to 
shedding unprofitable activities and onerous contracts, where appropriate ... Given the be goals of reorganization, the impact of the stay is greater and therefore more crucial than 
er in liquidation and can provide an important incentive to encourage debtors to initiate 
reorganization proceedings.' 151to
 
ns However, the UNCITRAL Guide also points out that the commence­

~a ment of business rescue proceedings and the imposition of a stay give 
nd notice to all those that do business with the debtor that the future of the 
business is uncertain. 152 This, in turn, creates 'a crisis of confidence and 
ed uncertainty as to how the insolvency proceedings will impact upon 
rat suppliers, customers and employees of the debtor's business'. 153 
.ne 
,he 149 See s 38 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
150 It is submitted that the cost and time factor will play a role here. Converting liquidation to 
.he 
." business rescue when the same result can be achieved under the liquidation provisions seems to be to su~ertluous. All that will be achieved in such a case is additional costs and further time wasted. 
51 UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 in par 179. an 
152 Ibid. 
ific 153 Ibid. 
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6.2.2.4 Duration of the Application of the Moratorium 
6.2.2.4.1 Unsecured Creditors 
It would appear that the insolvency laws of most countries provide for 
the moratorium to apply to unsecured creditors for the full duration of 
both liquidation and business rescue proceedings. 163 It would further 
appear sufficient to apply the stay to unsecured creditors until such time 
as the business rescue plan has been approved and has become 
effective. 164 
6.2.2.4.2 Secured Creditors 
The length of time that a stay should apply to secured creditors within 
a business rescue model appears to be more problematic. 165 At the very 
least it would appear that the stay should apply to secured creditors for a 
sufficient length of time in order to ensure that the business rescue can be 
conducted in an orderly fashion without any of the assets becoming 
separated before the business rescue plan can be finalised. 166 
For the following reasons it may be a good idea to limit the period of 
time during which a moratorium will be effective as regards secured 
creditors: 167 
•	 to avoid delays in proposing a business rescue plan; 
•	 to encourage a speedy resolution of the business rescue proceedings; 
•	 a fixed period provides certainty and predictability regarding the 
period of time that secured creditors will have to endure the limitation 
of their rights. 
The problem of determining a fixed period of time during which the 
moratorium will apply, is that the length of time specified may not be 
long enough to bring about a business rescue plan. 168 The manner in 
which this can be addressed is to provide for a specific period of time that 
can be lengthened by the court when the circumstances warrant it. 169 The 
alternative is not to specify the length of the stay, but to state in which 
circumstances relief may be obtained from the moratorium by secured 
creditors. 170 
It is suggested that a South African business rescue model should 
provide for a specified time limit, with the possibility of extending it 
should the circumstances warrant such an extension. Any extensions of 
163	 UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 in par 201. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Idem in par 203. 
166	 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. However, see also par 205 where it is stated that there should be a limitation on the 
len;:;th and number of extensions that may be acceded to. 
o Ibid. 
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the stay should be approved by the court, which will also provide secured 
creditors with an opportunity to oppose an extension in order to protect 
their interests. It is submitted that in this manner all the parties concerned 
will be obliged to work at bringing about a speedy and effective business 
rescue plan. 
6.2.2.5 Protection of Secured Creditors Under a Moratorium 
A moratorium on the enforcement of a secured creditor's rights may 
have a prejudicial effect on such a creditor, and it is for this reason that 
one needs to examine how any such prejudice can be limited or 
eliminated. 171 There are various manners in which this can be done, 
although a complete discussion falls outside the aim of this article. 172 At 
this stage it would, however, seem appropriate to at least determine 
whether secured creditors will enjoy some sort of protection should the 
moratorium continue for an extended length of time. Examples of how 
secured creditors' interests can be protected are: 
•	 A limitation of the duration of the moratorium; 
•	 Provisions allowing for the moratorium to be lifted; 
•	 Measures ensuring that the value of encumbered assets are protected 
against diminution (whether it be as a result of the use of the asset or as 
a result of the application of the moratorium); 
•	 By consulting with secured creditors on the use and sale of the 
encumbered assets; 
•	 By the payment of interest as far as the proceeds of the asset allow; 
•	 By taking over the asset where the asset is worth less than the secured 
claim. 
It is submitted that secured creditors should be included in the initial 
moratorium created as a result of the commencement of the business 
rescue proceeding, but that provisions providing relief should be included 
to protect secured creditors should there be an extension of the 
moratorium. 
6.2.3 Use and Disposal of Assets 173 
It is a general principle that the insolvency laws should not unduly 
interfere with the ownership rights of third parties or the rights of secured 
creditors. 174 However, in certain circumstances, especially in the case of 
business rescues, it may be necessary to apply these assets in order to 
achieve the desired objective. 175 
171 Idem in par 206. 
172 The various manners in which this can be done are discussed at some length in the 
UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 in pars 207-15. 
173 Idem in pars 220-4. 
174 Idem in par 220. 
175 Ibid. 
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When dealing with a business rescue situation, it will be necessary to 
provide that the business administrator has the right to freely use and 
dispose of certain assets if one wants to achieve the required objective. 176 
For this reason the UNCITRAL Guide suggests that a distinction should 
be made between the use and sale of assets in 'the normal course of 
business' and where they are used or disposed of in other circum­
stances. 177 For example, if a liquidator wishes to sell assets in terms of the 
current winding-up provisions of the Companies Act, he or she may need 
to first obtain prior authorisation from either the creditors or the Master. 
Having to obtain prior authorisation in a business rescue situation may 
hamper the business administrator in the performance of his or her 
functions. For this reason it would probably be necessary to clearly define 
when the business administrator will not be required to obtain prior 
approval. If the conduct of the business administrator is within the 
boundaries of the normal course of business, he or she should not be 
required to obtain prior approval, but should be allowed to make 
decision in the interests of continuing the business operations of the 
debtor. However, if the use and sale of assets falls outside the parameters 
of business rescue, then prior approval should be a requirement. 
6.2.4 Post-Commencement Finance 
6.2.4.1 Introduction 
Post-commencement finance is potentially one of the most important, 
and most problematic, aspects of a successful business rescue model. It 
has already been stated that the mere commencement of a business rescue 
proceeding will affect the creditworthiness of the debtor, and hence will .~ 
also create a lot of uncertainty regarding third parties' dealings with that 
debtor. 
However, the continued operation of a debtor's business after the 
commencement of a business rescue proceeding is critical to the success of 
the proceeding itself. 178 In order to continue trading the debtor will have 
to have access to funds in order to enable it to continue to pay for its 
operating expenses, including any costs that may be incurred in 
maintaining the value of assets. 179 
A distinction needs to be drawn between the cash flow that will be 
needed in order to continue trading up until the time a plan is proposed, 
on the one hand, and the cash flow that will be generated in terms of the 
proposed plan, on the other hand. 180 It is submitted that the business 
rescue provisions for South Africa should only address the access to post­
commencement financing for the first-mentioned period, namely the time 
176 Ibid. 
177 Idem in par 221. 
178 Idem in par 240. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Idem in par 241. 
.....
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leading up to the proposal and acceptance of a plan. The arrangements 
regarding financing after the implementation of a plan, should be left to 
the content of the plan itself. 181 For this reason this article will not 
address post-plan financing in any detail, and will concentrate on the 
provision of funding during the initial period of the business rescue 
proceedings. 
The UNCITRAL Guide mentions the following as possibilities 
regarding the provision of post-commencement finance: 182 
•	 There may be sufficient liquid assets, in the form of cash or other assets 
that can be converted to cash to fund the continuation of business 
operations; 
•	 Funding out of the debtor's existing cash flow through operation of the 
moratorium and the cessation of payments on pre-commencement 
liabilities; 
•	 Financing by third parties in the form of trade credit extended to the 
debtor by vendors of goods and services, or loans and other forms of 
finance extended by lenders; 
•	 Providing security for new loans with existing assets that have equity 
over and above the claims that are secured by them, or over 
unencumbered assets; 
•	 Provision of finance by family members or group companies; and 
•	 Borrowing by the business administrator in his or her own name. 
It should be clear that all the above examples have their limitations. 183 
Very few creditors would be keen to lend money to the debtor on an 
unsecured basis where the debtor is already subject to a business rescue 
proceeding. There may also be no unencumbered assets left in the estate, 
or the encumbered assets may not have sufficient equity with which to 
secure further credit. The problems associated with personal liability 
would also discourage most business administrators from incurring debt 
in their own name. 184 All these limitations have to be borne in mind when 
considering the thorny issue of post-commencement finance. 
6.2.4.2 Sources of Post-Commencement Finance 
Post-commencement finance could be provided by existing (pre­
business rescue) lenders and vendors, or it could be provided by new 
lenders and vendors. 185 Although these lenders would be motivated to 
lend for different reasons, both would only be prepared to do so if they 
are to be accorded special treatment under the business rescue 
provisions. 186 
181 Ibid. 
182 Idem in pars 240-4. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Idem in par 245. 
186 Ibid. 
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6.2.4.3 Attracting Post-Commencement Finance - Providing Se­ spe 
curity or Preference bus 
According to the UNCITRAL Guide a number of different approaches 
can be taken in order to attract post-commencement financing. 187 The 6.2 
different options are briefly set out below. } 
aut 
6.2.4.3.1 Granting Security	 fun 
sufjThis option can only be used where there are unencumbered assets in 
thethe estate that are capable of being used for this purpose. It is also 
so,possible to apply assets that are already encumbered and where there is 
sufficient equity in the property to accord further security to another	 nor 
becreditor. The UNCITRAL Guide points out that very often the only 
ereassets that will be able to be applied in the provision of new security are 
assets that have been recovered under the provisions dealing with	 exa 
sm(impeachable transactions ('avoidance proceedings'). 188 
, tior 
Wb6.2.4.3.2 Establishing a Priority (Preference) 
aut 
The only other workable alternative appears to be the establishment of 
a priority over the existing assets of the debtor in order to secure the 6.2 
necessary financirrg.F'" There are different levels at which such a 
1preference can be created in favour of the new lender. For example, the 
thi:loan could be secured by providing the lender with a priority over 
the unencumbered assets, in which case the lender will be paid, before the cor 
(
unsecured creditors, but not before secured creditors. It would therefore 
ms:qualify as an administration expense and be paid ahead of the claims of 
thethe unsecured creditors. 190 
Another example is where the new financing is paid as a type of 'super cor 
preference', in which case the lender will be paid in preference to all the are 
thecreditors in the estate, including the secured creditors. 191 In cases such as 
this the legislative provisions usually require prior court approval, as the ent 
existing rights of secured creditors will be affected. 192 COl 
(Under the current judicial management provisions of the Companies 
buAct, it is possible for the creditors, at a meeting convened for such 
delpurpose, to consent to post judicial management liabilities to be paid in 
prcpreference to their own claims. 193 This allows the judicial manager to 
incur new debts and which can then be paid in preference to the pre­ av: 
pr:judicial management claims. Something similar needs to be designed for a 
new business rescue model, but the authorisation procedure needs to be 
187 Idem in pars 246-50.
 
188 Idem in par 247.
 
189 Idem in pars 248-50.
 
190 Ibid.
 
191 Ibid.
 
192 Ibid.
 
din193 Section 435 of the Companies Act. 
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spelled out very clearly. The level of authorisation required by the 
business administrator is dealt with in par 6.2.4.4 below. 
6.2.4.4 Authorisation for Post-Commencement Finance 
A hierarchical approach is probably needed when it comes to the 
authorisation of a business administrator to obtain post-commencement 
funding.T'" For example, if unsecured assets, or secured assets with 
sufficient equity to provide additional security, are applied in obtaining 
the necessary finance, the business administrator should be allowed to do 
so without prior approval if the funding is required for transactions in the 
normal course of business. Where the post-commencement funding will 
be treated as an administrative preference or priority over unsecured 
creditors claims, some form of authorisation should be required, for 
example by the creditors or the court. 195 Where the amount is relatively 
small, creditor authorisation could be sufficient, while court authorisa­
tion could be required when the amount exceeds a specified threshold. 196 
Where the funding affects the rights of existing secured creditors, court 
authorisation should be obtained in order to secure the funding. 197 
6.2.5 Treatment of Contracts 198 
The treatment of a topic as wide as this is not realistic in an article of 
this nature. However, there are some important aspects regarding 
contracts that will have a major impact on business rescue proceedings. 
Generally it is submitted that the same rules regarding contracts in 
insolvency should apply to business rescue proceedings. This will enable 
the business administrator to maintain contracts that are beneficial to the 
continued business operations of the debtor, and to shed contracts that 
are not. While this is stated as a general rule, one should be cautious of 
the abuse that could emanate from such a practice, for example, a debtor 
entering a business rescue procedure in order to rid itself of onerous 
contracts that it no longer wishes to maintain. 
One specific type of contract that will need specific consideration in a 
business rescue procedure, is the employment contract 199 between the 
debtor and its employees.F'" Frequently business rescue procedures 
provide for the downsizing of the workforce in order to ensure the 
availability of additional cash flow. In addition, non-core or non­
profitable segments of the debtor's business may be sold off in order to 
194 UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 at par 251. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid. 
198 See, generally, UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 in pars 254-94. 
199 Idem in par 291. 
200 This excludes contracts of employment regarding the management of a debtor, such as 
directors, which are dealt with below. 
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ensure the debtor's survival. This may entail a loss of jobs and the 
resultant termination of the contracts of employment. 
However, in South Africa this may not be easily possible due to the 
stringent labour laws that apply by virtue of the Labour Relations Act. 
Recent amendments to this Act and the Insolvency Act reiterate the 
government's commitment to saving jobs and the protection of 
employees where the debtor experiences financial difficulties. In light of 
the recent amendments to s 38 of the Insolvency Act, it is submitted that 
the same rules should apply to a new business rescue procedure. Put 
differently, a business rescue procedure should also trigger the suspension 
of the contracts of employment, and not bring about their termination. 
The advantage this holds for the employee is that his or her contract of 
employment is not terminated, and passes to the new employer in cases 
where the business is sold as a going concern.r'" To further protect the 
employee, it will probably be necessary to build in provisions to ensure 
that a business rescue plan takes cognisance of the Labour Relations Act 
and the resultant retention of employment contracts. If this is not done 
an abuse of the business rescue procedure is a distinct possibility where, 
for example, the plan makes provision for the retrenchment of employees 
or the immediate termination of such contracts of employment. 
By only suspending the contracts and not terminating them, there is 
also a benefit for the business administrator. Although the employees are 
not required to perform any work, and are therefore not paid, this gives 
the business administrator some flexibility regarding the availability of 
funds that would normally be used to pay the employees' salaries. It also 
means that the business administrator can selectively re-employ, on an ad 
hoc basis, some or all of the employees that are needed to continue the 
business operations of the debtor. The added benefit here is that the 
employees already know the business and are properly trained to perform 
the specific functions required in order to keep the business operative. 
It is further submitted that any business rescue plan that deals with the 
retention or retrenchment of employees, be made subject to the current 
provisions of the Labour Relations Act. 202 This may, however, 
necessitate the amendment of some of the provisions of the Labour 
Relations Act (as well as some of the provisions of the Insolvency Act) to 
tie in with a business rescue procedure. 
6.2.6 Impeachable Transactions 203 
In many cases the receipt of funds generated as a result of having set 
aside impeachable transactions can ensure the continued existence of a 
debtor's business. For this reason it is submitted that a business 
201 In terms of s 197A of the Labour Relations Act. 
202 For example, retrenchments in terms of s 189 of the Labour Relations Act. 
203 See further UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 in pars 295-348 where this aspect is dealt with 
in detail. 
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administrator should be able to implement provisions relating to 
impeachable transactions in a business rescue situation. This is currently 
the case under the judicial management provisions 204 contained in the 
Companies Act, and should be retained under a new business rescue 
model. 
6.2.7 Participation by the Debtor After the Commencement of a 
Business Rescue Proceeding 205 
Another important question that can arise in a business rescue 
situation, is to what extent the debtor should still be involved in the 
administration process once the business rescue proceeding has 
commenced. There are many facets to the involvement of the debtor 
after the commencement of a business rescue proceeding, a detailed 
discussion of most of which would fall outside the scope of the present 
article. However, there are basically two categories under which all these 
facets can be discussed, namely the involvement of the debtor in the 
continued operations of the business of the debtor, and the debtor's 
obligation to assist the business administrator in furnishing important 
information that would be needed for the implementation of a business 
rescue plan. 
6.2.7.1	 Involvement of the Debtor in the Business Operations After 
the Commencement of Business Rescue Proceedings 
There are many jurisdictions where the existing management of a 
debtor is displaced by the person appointed to implement the business 
rescue. Even under South Africa's current judicial management 
provisions the management of a company is displaced by a judicial 
manager or provisional judicial manager once appointed. 206 
However, according to the UNCITRAL Guide there are a number of 
advantages if the existing management's involvement is continued after 
the commencement of the proceedings. 207 For example, the management 
of the debtor will have an intimate knowledge of its business and the 
industry within which it operatcs.r'" Such knowledge may assist the 
business administrator in performing his or her functions with a more 
immediate andcomplete understanding of the operation of the debtor's 
business activities. 209 This knowledge may also assist in the proposal of a 
workable business rescue plan. By displacing the debtor in such 
circumstances it may lead to '[an elimination of} an incentive for 
entrepreneurial activity, risk-taking in general and for debtors to 
204 Section 436 of the Companies Act. 
205 See, generally, UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 in pars 361-93. 
206 Section 428(2)(a) of the Companies Act. 
207 UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 in pars 365-9. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
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commence reorganization procedures at an early stage'. 210 It may also 
undermine the likelihood of a workable business rescue plan. 211 
However, there are also some potential disadvantages to retaining the 
involvement of the management of a debtor once business rescue 
proceedings have commenced, for example: 
•	 creditors may have a lack of confidence in the management of the 
debtor due to its financial woes; and 
•	 allowing the management of the debtor to continue may exacerbate the 
breakdown of confidence and antagonise creditors further. 
While there are certainly some advantages to retaining the services of 
the management of the debtor in some way, the commitment of the 
management to do so may depend on how the business rescue proceeding 
was commenced in the first place. For example, if the debtor itself applied 
for the implementation of the business rescue provisions, there will in all 
probability be a commitment from the management to assist in keeping 
the debtor out of liquidation. In such a case the management's assistance 
can be extremely helpful, if not indispensable. However, if the debtor has 
been forced into a business rescue by some other party such as the 
employees or a creditor, then the management may be antagonistic 
towards all the parties concerned. In such a case the assistance of the 
management would probably not be forthcoming. 
It is uncertain whether in South Africa this is an aspect that should be 
legislated to merely include or exclude the involvement of the manage­
ment of the debtor in a business rescue situation. Perhaps the solution 
would be to displace the management of the debtor, but to include a 
provision where the business administrator, after consultation with the 
creditors and the employees, has a choice to retain the involvement (to 
whatever extent) of the existing management. In this way the manage­
ment can be excluded where their involvement would be to the detriment 
of the business rescue, and retained where it could be to its benefit. 
Another option would be to provide for the retention of the management 
on a consultative basis only, and where they would have no say in the 
day-to-day running of the business. 
6.2.7.2 Involvement of the Debtor in Furnishing Information 2 12 
It is clear that there should be an obligation on the management of the 
debtor to provide complete and detailed information regarding the 
business activities of the debtor. Without such information it is unlikely 
that any form of business rescue plan would be capable of implementa­
tion. For this reason suitable provisions will have to be designed in order 
to obtain the information from the existing management of the debtor. 
The actual information that is required can be set out in a form which the 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212	 Idem in pars 383-6. I 
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management of the debtor would be obliged to complete. Suitable 
sanctions can be built into the provisions where full and frank disclosure 
has not been made. 
In addition, the existing provisions relating to interrogations (inquiries) 
as currently set out in ss 414 to 418 of the Companies, could be made 
applicable in order to obtain such information should it not be 
forthcoming. This is currently the situation under the judicial manage­
ment provisions of the Companies Act. 213 
6.2.8 The Business Administrator/'Turnaround Manager,214 
6.2.8.1 Introduction 
For ease of reference the insolvency representative 215 is referred to as a 
'business administrator'. By business administrator is meant the person 
that will displace the management of the debtor and conduct the business 
rescue proceedings on behalf of all the parties involved. 
This aspect of a new business rescue model for South Africa will 
probably be the most difficult to implement. It is safe to state that South 
Africa does not generally have a business rescue culture, and therefore 
there may be very few people who have the necessary expertise to 
genuinely call themselves 'turnaround managers', 'company doctors', or 
any other name by which such specialists gO.216 To exacerbate the 
problern, South Africa does not have a formally regulated insolvency 
profession. Although it would appear that this aspect is at long last being 
addressed by both government and the insolvency profession, it will be of 
little value when deciding who should be entrusted with the task of being 
appointed to implement a new business rescue model. 
In countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom insolvency 
practitioners, who appear to consist mainly of accountants, are appointed 
as business administrators. However, in the United States of America it is 
mainly lawyers that are appointed to implement the Chapter 11 cases. 
One is tempted to state that in the South African context only 
accountants should be appointed to conduct business rescue proceed­
ings. However.rthis would be unfair to the many attorneys and some 
liquidators that are quite capable of handling a business rescue 
proceeding, not to mention other experts that ply their trade outside 
the confines of the legal and accounting professions. Perhaps the answer 
lies in rather laying down certain minimum criteria regarding qualifica­
213 See s 439(2) of the Companies Act. 
214 For a complete discussion of this important aspect in the UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6, 
in ~ars 394-433. 
15 The UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 uses the term 'insolvency representative' to denote the 
insolvency representative or practitioner in both liquidation and business rescue proceedings. 
216 It needs to be stated that there are in fact private organisations in South Africa that are 
extremely active in the 'turnaround' business. However, these companies and the specialists 
employed by them are not active in the insolvency or liquidation industry. They operate outside 
the insolvency regime and are mostly active in the sphere of informal creditor workouts. 
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tions and/or appropriate experience when making such appointments, 
than looking at one specific sector, professional or otherwise. 
Currently there is an initiative by the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development to create a separate panel of 'turnaround 
experts'. The task team that was requested to submit a report in this 
regard, recommended that an association of some sort should be 
established that could develop the criteria for appointments to this 
panel. Unfortunately it would appear that the criteria will be coupled to 
the practical experience of individuals within their own chosen 
profession, for example, an attorney who has practiced for his or her 
own account for at least five years. With respect, such an approach can 
never be beneficial for a new turnaround or business rescue industry in 
South Africa. The fact that an attorney, for example, has practiced for his 
or her own account for a period of five years does not qualify them as a 
business rescue expert. It is submitted that the criteria should rather be 
based on experience, qualifications and expertise within the sphere of 
business. 217 
It has also been suggested in some quarters that the persons that 
qualify for appointment as business rescue administrators should not also 
be allowed to be appointed as liquidators in insolvent estates. While it 
makes sense not to allow the same person from being appointed as both 
business administrator and liquidator in the same estate, it is difficult to 
justify the exclusion of liquidators, for example, from being allowed to 
act also as business administrators. These potentially problematic aspects 
need to be approached with sensitivity and care, and -it is suggested that 
proper research be conducted into the suitability of all persons that are to 
enter the business rescue profession. 
6.2.8.2 What Qualities Are Required of a Business Administrator? 
The UNCITRAL Guide is quite helpful in pointing out the necessity of 
appointing suitably qualified persons to conduct the work of a business 
administrator. In par 394 of the UNCITRAL Guide, it is stated that 'it is 
essential that the insolvency representative be appropriately qualified and 
possess the knowledge, experience and personal qualities that will ensure 
not only the effective and efficient conduct of the proceedings, but also 
that there is confidence in the insolvency system'. 218 In par 396 of the 
UNCITRAL Guide the following important statement is also made: 
'396. In determining the qualifications required for appointment as an insolvency 
representative, it is desirable that a balance be achieved between stringent requirements 
that lead to the appointment of a highly qualified person but which may significantly 
217 See par 6.2.8.2 below where this aspect is discussed at length. 
218 UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 6 in par 394. If current media coverage of the insolvency 
profession is anything to go by, it is clear that the current insolvency system does not inspire 
confidence. For this reason the system in terms of which business rescue proceedings will be 
conducted needs to be thoroughly planned and implemented. 
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restrict the pool of professionals considered to be appropriately qualified and add to the 
costs of the proceedings, and requirements that are too low to guarantee the quality of 
the service required. Where there is a lack of appropriately qualified professionals, the 
role given to the court in appointment and supervision of the insolvency representative 
may be an important factor in achieving the required balance.' 
The aspects which are discussed in pars 6.2.8.2.1 to 6.2.8.2.8 regarding 
the appointment of business administrators, and which are relevant in the 
South African context, have been gleaned from the UNCITRAL 
Guide. 219 
6.2.8.2.1 Knowledge and Experience 220 
According to the UNCITRAL Guide '[t]he complexity of many 
insolvency proceedings makes it highly desirable that the insolvency 
representative be appropriately qualified with knowledge of the law (not 
only insolvency law, but also the relevant commercial, finance and 
business law), as well as adequate experience in commercial and financial 
matters, including accounting'. 221 
It seems appropriate that business administrators should possess the 
requisite skills in order to carry out their functions in a business rescue 
environment. However, it must also be borne in mind that persons who 
do not, for example, have the requisite legal skills may employ an 
attorney to assist them in the carrying out of their duties. Similarly, an 
attorney without the requisite commercial or accounting skills could 
employ an accountant to assist in the performance of his or her functions. 
However, as a point of departure it seems clear that prospective business 
administrators should at least meet some or other minimum criteria 
regarding professional qualifications. In addition to these minimum 
qualifications (see par 6.2.8.2.2 below) a prospective business adminis­
trator should demonstrate that he or she possesses sufficient practical 
experience in order to be appointed to such a responsible position. 
6.2.8.2.2 Appropriate Qualifications 222 
By qualifications are meant not only professional qualifications and 
examinations, but also the requirements set by licensing authorities, 
specialised training courses and certification examinations, requirements 
for certain levels of experience in relevant areas (for example finance, 
commerce, accounting and law), and continuing professional education 
to ensure awareness of current developments in the applicable areas of 
law and practice. 223 
A combination of all the above is to be preferred, and should be set as a 
prerequisite before entry to this profession is allowed. It has already been 
219 Idem in pars 398-406. 
220 Idem in par 398. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Idem in par 399. 
223 Ibid. 
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stated that a professional organisation catering for business rescue should 6.:
 
be established as soon as possible, and be given statutory recognition.
 
The statutory recognition of such persons could be included in the
 So 
provisions for a new business rescue model that will eventually be esj 
developed and implemented. of 
ca 
6.2.8.2.3 Personal Qualities 224	 ba 
The UNCITRAL Guide refers to personal qualities such as integrity, 
coimpartiality, and good management skills. 225 Since these are qualities 
anthat are already required under South Africa's current insolvency laws, 
anthey will not be expanded on in this article. 
In 
re6.2.8.2.4 Conflicts of Interest226 
A: 
This is a well-known requirement under current South African law, th 
and is contained in the affidavit of non-interest that has to be lodged by bI 
all incumbent trustees and liquidators. Consequently this requirement se 
will not be discussed here. re 
bl 
6.2.8.2.5 Selection and Appointrnerrr""	 d{ 
ccIt is submitted that in the South African context the selection and 
joappointment of business administrators should be dealt with separately. 
It is fair to state that there have been numerous problems with the current 
appointment criteria (regarding trustees and liquidators) applied by the st 
Master of the High Court. The situation has become so contaminated s~ 
that the whole appointment process currently lacks credibility. 
As far as selection procedures are concerned, it is submitted that an re 
tiindependent professional association should be established that can 
uintroduce procedures for the selection of persons that can act as business 
administrators. The selection criteria must be spelt out clearly, and the v 
procedures for the selection of candidates must be as transparent as s~ 
possible. It is submitted that the actual appointment procedure (of a 
persons that qualify and have been selected to fill the post of business n 
Cladministrator) should be a creditor 228 or court-driven 229 process, and 
hthat the Master should have no say as to who is appointed (although the 
Master will have to issue the letters of appointment as such). Whether a n 
court- or creditor-driven process will be applied will ultimately depend on " lithe manner in which a business rescue proceeding will be commenced 
flunder a new South African model. 
[ 
[ 
224 Idem in par 400. 
225 Ibid.
 
226 Idem in pars 401-2.
 
227 Idem in pars 403-6.
 
228 Idem in par 406.
 
229 Idem in par 404.
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6.2.8.2.6 Remuneration 230 
The remuneration payable to trustees and liquidators under current 
South African insolvency law has been a bone of contention for decades, 
especially in very large estates where there are assets worth many millions 
of rands. The reason for this is that the current system of remuneration is 
calculated as a percentage of the sale price of estate assets (a commission­
based system) according to a predetermined tariff guide. 
In the UNCITRAL Guide it is stated that the 'remuneration should be 
commensurate with the qualifications of the insolvency representative 
and the tasks it is required to perform, and achieve a balance between risk 
and reward in order to attract appropriately qualified professionals'. 231 
Internationally several methods are employed for calculating the 
remuneration, some of which are discussed in this pander this heading. 
As far as the 'risk and reward' approach is concerned, it is submitted that 
there should be some sort of incentive for the business administrator to 
bring about a successful business rescue plan. In other words, it makes 
sense to adopt a method whereby the business administrator will be 
rewarded in cases where the business rescue is successful, either because a 
business rescue plan has been implemented, or because the business of the 
debtor has been sold as a going concern, thereby ensuring the debtor's 
continued participation in the country's economy and the retention of 
jobs for the employees. 
Some of the international methods of calculating a business admini­
strators remuneration include 232 time-based systems, commission-based 
systems and involvement of creditors. 
South Africa currently employs a commission-based system of 
remuneration (although the judicial management provisions allow for a 
time-based system that is taxed by the Master) where the trustee or 
liquidator becomes entitled to a fixed percentage of the proceeds of the 
various types of assets in that particular estate. The disadvantage of this 
system is the payment of very high fees in estates with large and valuable 
assets, while the work performed may not be commensurate with the 
remuneration. Conversely, in small estates the fees may also not be 
commensurate with the work performed. The advantage of this system, 
however, is that all the creditors will pay a proportionate portion of the 
remuneration, and unsecured creditors will not necessarily be burdened 
with the payment of the fees. The Master taxes the fee of trustees and 
liquidators, and can act as an important counter-balance where excessive 
fees are claimed in an estate. 
Many people believe that a time-based system of remuneration is the 
better option. The advantage of this system is that the fee will normally 
be commensurate with the amount of work done, no matter how large the 
230 Idem in pars 412-8.
 
231 Idem in par 412.
 
232 Idem in pars 413-5.
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value of the debtor's estate. According to the UNCITRAL Guide one 6., 
disadvantage of a time-based system of remuneration 'is that although it 
may encourage a very thorough administration, [it] may also operate in A: 
some cases as an incentive to maximise the time spent on administration ad 
without necessarily achieving a proportional return of value to the en 
estate'. 233 lIT 
Whatever option is employed in the South African context, it is clear of 
that there should be some mechanism whereby the business adminis­ ac 
trator's remuneration can be taxed. Since the Master currently performs 
this function in insolvent estates, it is perhaps appropriate that the Master 6. 
also tax the fee of business administrators with the input and approval of 
the estate creditors. 6. 
6.2.8.2.7 Personal Liability234 pr 
It seems unnecessary to debate whether or not a business administrator th 
should be required to provide security for the proper performance of his la 
or her functions. The only question that needs to be posed is what form cr 
the security should take. Currently trustees and liquidators have to st 
provide the Master with a bond of security for the full value of the estate al 
assets in order to ensure the proper performance of their duties. This es 
system appears to work quite well in practice, and should probably be a 
continued under a business rescue model. It goes without saying that the dt 
cost involved in providing security will be paid as an administration 
expense from the assets of the debtor. In 
One additional question that may be raised in the business rescue th 
context, is the extent to which a business administrator should be held bl 
personally liable, especially in cases where the business administrator cr 
continues with the business of the debtor that has become subject to the pl 
provisions of a business rescue procedure. m 
li( 
6.2.8.2.8 Duties and Functions of a Business AdministratorF" pl 
blA list of some twenty duties and functions are listed by the 
mUNCITRAL Guide as the type of duties and functions that must be 
efperformed by the business administrator. 236 These duties and functions 
are of a general nature and deal mainly with the taking charge of the 
6estate, representing the debtor, continuing with the business of the debtor 
and conducting other tasks that are related to the proper functioning of 
the estate, providing information to all participants, etcetera. While it is Cl 
not intended to discuss all these duties and functions here, it goes without Cl 
saying that these duties will form part and parcel of any new business a~ 
rescue model that is introduced in South Africa. 
233 Idem in par 413.
 
234 Idem in pars 419-24.
 
235 Idem in pars 408-10.
 
236 Idem in par 408.
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6.2.8.3 Conclusion 
\1 a new 'ou~\ne~~ rescue moue\ \~ ~ucce~~lu\\y \mp\emen\eu \n ~ou\'n 
Africa, it will bring about a whole new profession of business 
administration. For this reason it is important that all the issues 
enumerated above be given considerable thought before such a system is 
implemented. If a new business rescue model is to have even a modicum 
of credibility, it is essential that the persons appointed are professional, 
accountable and effective. 
6.2.9 Creditors' Participation in the Business Rescue Procedure ?" 
6.2.9.1 Introduction 
There are various levels of creditor participation in business rescue 
proceedings internationally. 238 The level of participation by creditors in 
the proceedings depend mainly on the design of the overall insolvency 
laws of a particular country.239 Generally speaking, the involvement of 
creditors in the process is justified by the fact that they are the main 
stakeholders should the business rescue succeed or fail. 240 Creditors can 
also act as a safeguard against abuse by the business administrator, 
especially if the business administrator is required to consult creditors on 
a regular basis and before major decisions in regard to the affairs of the 
debtor are taken. 
There are too many detailed aspects to creditor participation to include 
in this article. However, it is necessary to at least discuss the approach 
that can be adopted to ensure maximum creditor involvement in a new 
business rescue model. It is generally accepted that in South Africa 
creditors tend to be apathetic in their participation in insolvency 
proceedings. The argument by creditors is probably that there is not 
much to be gained by attending creditor meetings, as the trustee or 
liquidator will in any event have to sell the assets and distribute the 
proceeds in terms of the provisions of the insolvency laws. However, in a 
business rescue environment the creditors stand to gain (and lose) a lot 
more, and it is submitted that it is therefore necessary to ensure more 
effective creditor participation under a new business rescue procedure. 
6.2.9.2 The Role of Secured Creditors 241 
At this stage already it needs to be determined what the role of secured 
creditors will be in a business rescue procedure. Apart from the secured 
creditor's interest in its security, and any act by the business 
administrator that will affect such security, secured creditors will 
237 See generally UNCITRAL Guide op cit note in pars 434-75. 
238 Idem in pars 436-7. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Idem in par 434. 
241 Idem in par 444. 
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normally not have an interest in the administration of the estate generally 
where the security is sufficient to cover the claim of such creditor. 242 
However, to the extent that a secured creditor's claim is not covered by its 
security it does have an interest in the general administration of the estate 
and the eventual outcome of the business rescue procedure. For this 
reason it is suggested that a secured creditor's participation in the 
business rescue proceedings should generally be limited to the extent to 
which they are unsecured. 
There are existing provisions in current insolvency legislation that 
recognise this limitation on secured creditors' participation.P" and it is 
submitted that these provisions should be extended to business rescue 
proceedings. 
6.2.9.3 Functions to be Performed by Creditors 244 
Due to the fact that South Africa has a pro-creditor insolvency system, 
creditors will to a large extent determine how and by whom the 
insolvency process will be conducted. For example, the creditors elect a 
trustee or liquidator, they can give the trustee or liquidator instructions at 
meetings of creditors and they can vote in favour of the acceptance of a 
composition or compromise. 
This approach should in all probability be carried over to a business 
rescue model, since it is ultimately the creditors who stand to lose should 
the rescue attempt fail. Working from this premise it may be accepted 
that the creditors will also exercise a large degree of control over the 
business rescue procedure. However, creditors will not have a say in all 
aspects of the administration of a business rescue, and for this reason the 
matters on which creditors will have a say will need to be clearly spelled 
out. For example, while creditors will have a say in regard to the content 
of the business rescue plan, they will not necessarily have a say over the 
day-to-day running of the business of the debtor by the business 
administrator. 
The manner in which creditors usually participate in proceedings is to 
allow them to vote on the issues that need deciding. There are many 
aspects to voting at meetings, especially regarding the matters on which 
voting is required (for example, on whether new debt can be incurred, or 
voting for the acceptance of a business rescue plan). These aspects need to 
be clearly set out in the business rescue provisions. 
6.2.9.4 Mechanisms to Facilitate Participation by Creditors 245 
There are various mechanisms used internationally in order to facilitate 
242 Ibid.
 
243 See, eg, s 52(5) of the Insolvency Act.
 
244 Idem in pars 445-50.
 
245 Idem in pars 439-41.
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participation by creditors in the business rescue procedure. The two main 
methods appear to be meetings of creditors and creditor committees. 246 
6.2.9.4.1 Creditor Meetings 247 
Creditor meetings are well known in South Africa, since they are 
currently used in insolvency proceedings. Meetings are convened at key 
moments during the administration process, which ensures maximum 
creditor participation at a time when decisions need to be taken. A similar 
approach will probably need to be taken in a business rescue context, 
although the timing of these meetings will largely differ from the timing in 
the case of insolvency proceedings. The main object of the meetings will 
be to obtain instructions from the creditors in regard to decisions that 
need to be taken regarding the business rescue of the debtor. 
One question that arises is what type of majority (of votes) will be 
needed at a business rescue meeting of creditors in order to implement a 
decision. For example, when a business rescue plan is submitted to a 
meeting of creditors, will the majority be a simple majority in number and 
value, or will the plan require a larger majority (say 75 percent) of the 
votes before it can be implemented? The various possibilities here need to 
be properly explored, as too large a majority may hamper the 
introduction of a successful business rescue plan. However, considering 
that all creditors will be bound by the business rescue plan, a marginal 
majority may not be an acceptable result either. 
It is also preferable that the business rescue provisions clearly spell out 
the matters on which creditors must vote. 248 Similarly, the voting 
requirements regarding each type of decision will need to be included in 
such provisions.r''" It is submitted that only actions by the business 
administrator that will have a significant impact on the general body of 
creditors, will need to be voted on. Examples of these would include 
voting for the appointment of a business administrator, approval of a 
business rescue plan, approval of post-commencement finance and the 
sale of a substantial portion of the debtor's assets. 250 
When deciding how the insolvency meetings are to be convened and 
where they are to be held, reference will need to be made to the proposed 
manner in which creditor meetings will be held in terms of the proposed 
new Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill. This will promote uniformity 
and certainty regarding all procedures in terms of the new Bill. 
246 It is to be noted that some insolvency jurisdictions use a combination of the two.
 
247 Idem in pars 451-4.
 
248 Idem in pars 471-4.
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6.2.9.4.2 Creditor Committees 251 
There are a number of jurisdictions that make use of creditor 
committees to ensure creditor participation in the business rescue 
proceeding. There are definite advantages to the use of creditor 
committees in very large estates where there are large numbers of 
creditors. The appointment of a creditor committee to represent all 
creditors then streamlines the process and leads to a more efficient 
administration process. However, creditor committees can also be costly 
affairs as the representatives on the creditor committee may need to be 
remunerated for the duties they perform. 
While there can be no general opposition to the use of creditor 
committees in practice, careful thought needs to go into whether or not 
they should be introduced under a South African business rescue model. 
Aspects such as representation, liability and the expense involved in 
forming and running such committees need to be carefully considered 
when deciding whether or not to implement such a system. 252 
6.2.10 The Business Rescue 'Plan' 
6.2.10.1 Introduction 
The design, acceptance and implementation of a business rescue plan is 
surely one of the most important aspects of a modern business rescue 
model. One of the drawbacks of judicial management is that the judicial 
manager is required to trade the ailing business out of trouble until all its 
creditors have been paid, and the business is once again a viable, solvent 
entity. By introducing the proposal, acceptance and implementation of a 
business rescue plan, the reorganisation of a debtor can be brought to 
finality a lot sooner, with the added advantage that it creates certainty for 
all the parties involved as to what the outcome of the business rescue will 
be once a plan has been accepted and implemented. 
As regards the nature and form of a business rescue plan, the 
UNCITRAL Guide states the following as a point of departure: 253 
'483. The purpose of reorganization is to maximize the possible eventual return to 
creditors, providing a better result than if the debtor were to be liquidated and to preserve 
viable businesses as a means of preserving jobs for employees and trade for suppliers. 
With different constituents involved in the reorganization process, each may have 
different views of how the various objectives can best be achieved. Some creditors, such 
as major customers or suppliers, may prefer continued business with the debtor to rapid 
repayment of their debt. Some creditors may prefer an equity stake in the business, while 
others will not. Typically, therefore, there is a range of options from which to select in a 
given case and if an insolvency law adopts a prescriptive approach to the range of options 
available or to the choice to be made in a particular case, it is likely to be too constrictive 
251 Idem in pars 455-70. 
252 Idem in pars 455-70 for a detailed exposition on the advantages and disadvantages of this 
mechanism for creditor participation. 
253 Idem in par 483. 
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... A non-intrusive approach that does not adopt ... limitations is likely to provide the 
flexibility sufficient to allow the most suitable of a range of possibilities to be chosen for a 
particular debtor.' 
While it is submitted that the business rescue provisions should 
regulate as many of the aspects of a business rescue plan as possible, it 
will also be necessary that these be limited to procedural issues such as 
who may propose a plan, the voting on a plan, the implementation of a 
plan and how the plan will be given effect to. However, the content of a 
plan should be left as open-ended as possible to allow for just about 
anything to be achieved that is not in conflict with any of the other laws 
of the Republic. · 
There are a wide range of issues that can be discussed when it comes to 
a business rescue plan, all of which cannot be properly debated in the 
parameters of this article. There are, however, a number of core issues 
relating to the plan that need to be highlighted. These core issues are: 
• the proposal of the business rescue plan; 
• the plan itself; 
• approval of the plan; 
• steps to be taken where a proposed plan cannot be approved; 
• binding dissenting classes of creditors ('cran1-down' provisions); 
• confirmation of the plan (if set as a requirement); 
• effect of an approved plan; 
• legal challenges to the plan; 
• amendment of the plan after approval; 
• implementation of the plan; 
• where implementation of the plan fails; and 
• conversion to liquidation. 
The most important issues arising from these core elements of the plan 
are briefly discussed below. Finally, it should be mentioned that the 
instrument in terms of which a proposed business rescue plan will be 
implemented will also be of importance. For example, under the 
Australian system of voluntary administration the plan is implemented 
by means of a Deed of Company Arrangement. It is a document that 
embodies the business rescue plan and, once executed, regulates the rights 
and obligations of all the parties regarding that specific debtor. Once the 
Deed of Company Arrangement has been executed, the administration 
comes to an end and the company is henceforth regulated by such Deed. 
The form in which a business rescue plan in South Africa will be 
implemented, also needs to be given serious consideration. 
440 (2004) 16 SA Mere LJ 
6.2.10.2 The Proposal of the Business Rescue Plan254 
There are two important issues that are relevant here, namely the 
timing of the business rescue plan (in other words at what stage of the 
proceedings a plan should be proposed), and the parties who are capable 
of proposing a plan. 
6.2.10.2.1 Timing of the Business Rescue Plan 
Some jurisdictions provide for a plan to be proposed at the time the 
application for business rescue is proposed, while others provide for the 
plan to be proposed only after the commencement of the business rescue 
proceeding. The submission of a plan at the time the application is made, 
or at the time the business rescue proceeding commences, may not be a 
realistic option if creditor and/or employee input on the plan is required. 
The post-commencement negotiation and proposal of a plan would 
probably be a more flexible approach where the input of all the parties 
affected can be obtained. It is submitted that such an approach would be 
less prescriptive, and for this reason it is to be preferred. However, checks 
and balances will have to be built into the system to avoid an abuse of 
proceedings where, for example, a debtor has merely commenced a 
business rescue procedure in order to obtain the automatic stay (with no 
intention of proposing a workable business rescue plan). 
An additional aspect that needs consideration is the imposition of time 
limits for the proposal of a plan. According to the UNCITRAL Guide the 
imposition of time limits vary from 35 days to' 120 days in the various 
jurisdictions. In this regard it is submitted that a flexible approach should 
be adopted in terms of which the plan can be proposed within as short a 
time as possible, but where the time can be extended in appropriate cases. 
6.2.10.2.2 Parties Permitted to Propose a Plan 
When it comes to the proposal of a business rescue plan, there are 
various approaches that could be adopted. For example the debtor, 
creditors, employees or the business administrator could all be authorised 
to propose a plan. Such an open-ended approach may however delay the 
process as each party tries to secure the implementation of their own 
proposals. It is submitted that an option where the business administrator 
proposes a plan, after consultation with all the stakeholders, would be a 
workable solution within the South African context. 
6.2.10.3 The Business Rescue Plan255 
There are basically two aspects that need to be discussed under this 
heading, namely the content of the plan and the information that should 
accompany the proposal of a plan. 
254 Idem in pars 486-96.
 
255 Idem in pars 497-505.
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6.2.10.3.1 Content of the Business Rescue Plan 
It would be extremely difficult to draft legislative provisions that can 
cater for all eventualities under a business rescue plan. It is also submitted 
that such an approach would be too prescriptive, not allowing enough 
flexibility for a business administrator to propose a workable plan given 
the circumstances in that particular estate. In accordance with the 
suggestions made in the UNCITRAL Guide,256 it may be more 
acceptable to identify the minimum content of a plan which focuses on 
its key objectives and the procedures for its implementation. It should 
also clearly set out the impact it will have on the various parties which are 
subject to the plan. 
6.2.10.3.2 Information that Must Accompany a Proposed Plan 
In order to assist interested parties in making an informed decision as 
to the acceptability of a proposed plan, as much information as possible 
should be provided to them prior to the point at which they will be 
required to vote on the proposal. In this regard it is submitted that the 
legislative provisions should at least determine the minimum amount of 
information that, must be provided, and that information must 
accompany the plan when it is submitted to the stakeholders for their 
consideration. Minimum information such as the following could be 
considered: 
•	 full information regarding the financial position of the debtor 
(including asset and liability and cash flow statements); 
•	 a comparison between what will be received by creditors under the plan 
and what could be expected to be received by them under liquidation; 
•	 the basis upon which the debtor will be able to continue trading and 
subsequently be reorganised; 
•	 the voting mechanisms that apply in approving the plan; and 
•	 information showing that the plan is capable of implementation and 
that the debtor is able to meet its commitments under the plan. 
It is suggested that this information should be set out in regulations 
that can be updated and/or amended regularly and swiftly, as and when 
the need arises. 
6.2.10.4 Approval of the Business Rescue Plan 257 
6.2.10.4.1 Introduction 
The issues surrounding the approval of a business rescue plan, 
especially one that will bind dissenting creditors, are complex and 
multi-faceted. The competing interests of the various stakeholders may 
256 Idem in par 500.
 
257 Idem in pars 506-29.
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necessitate a division of the various types of creditors into classes, for e 
example, secured creditors, preferential creditors, unsecured creditors, the a 
employees, shareholders and the like. It should be borne in mind that, as tJ 
a general principle, creditors should only be bound by a plan if they have t~ 
been given an opportunity to vote on the plan. 258 
The main purpose of dividing the claims into various categories, is to r 
ensure that all creditors have been treated in a fair and equitable manner. a 
The UNCITRAL Guide points out that this method also ensures that v 
(statutory) preferential claims are treated in accordance with the 
preferences established under the insolvency laws. 259 The downside to r 
this method (of classifying claims) is that it can increase the complexity r 
and costs of the business rescue proceeding, depending on how many s 
categories are established. 260 
6.2.10.4.2 Procedures for Approval E 
It seems fair to state that before creditors can be expected to vote on a 
plan, they must be given sufficient time to study the content of the plan s 
prior to a meeting (or meetings) being called to vote on the acceptance c 
thereof. It is clear that a special meeting or meetings will have to be I 
convened for voting on the plan to take place.	 c 
As far as the voting itself is concerned, provision will probably have to l 
be made for creditors to vote in person, by proxy or electronically (for 
example, by e mail). Other issues that may arise when it comes to voting r 
on the plan are: 
•	 whether creditors will vote generally or in classes; 
•	 the types of claims that will be recognised for the purposes of voting 
(for example only on the basis of admitted claims, or also on the basis 
of claims that have been provisionally admitted); 
•	 whether secured creditors will be required to vote; 
•	 whether (statutory) preferential claims will be considered in determin­
ing whether a majority has been obtained; 
•	 which interested parties (other than creditors) will be allowed to vote 
on a plan (for example, employees, who will not necessarily be 
creditors of the debtor); and 
•	 how creditors that abstain from voting, or those who do not participate 
in the process at all, will be treated (in other words, are they regarded 
as having voted against the plan, or are they left out of the voting 
equation?). 
6.2.10.4.3 Requirements for Approval of the Proposed Plan 
The majority required for the approval of a proposed plan will depend 
on whether creditors vote generally or within their various classes. For 
258 Idem in par 506.
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example, if there are three classes of creditors voting for the acceptance of 
a plan, the majority will then need to be determined within each class. It 
then has to be determined what type of majority is required from the 
three classes before the plan can be accepted. 
The alternative is to provide that creditors vote generally, and the 
requisite majority in number of value carries the day. Most systems 
appear to work on a system of at least two-thirds or three-quarters in 
value, and at least half or two-thirds in number. 
The current rules contained in South Africa's insolvency laws 
regarding voting may prove to be helpful when designing these new 
rules for the acceptance of a business rescue plan, for example, where 
secured creditors are only allowed to vote on the unsecured portion of 
their claims. 
6.2.10.5 Steps to be Taken When the Plan Cannot be Approved 261 
The provisions regarding the acceptance or not of a plan should be 
sufficiently flexible to allow for the terms of the plan to be modified 
during the voting process. In this way the meeting convened for the 
purposes of voting can be adjourned to enable further negotiation on the 
content of the pian. However, considering the abuse that can take place if 
unlimited adjournments are allowed, there should probably be a 
limitation on the number of times an adjournment can be allowed for 
modification of the plan. 
Where the plan is not acceptable to the requisite majority of creditors, 
and no acceptable resolution by modification of the plan can be achieved, 
there should at least be some mechanism that can bring this process to a 
close. The two options in this regard appear to be a conversion from 
business rescue to liquidation, or a mere termination of the business 
rescue proceedings which places the debtor where it was prior to the 
business rescue proceedings 'having commenced. It is submitted that the 
mere threat of liquidation in the case of the non-acceptance of a business 
rescue plan may operate to encourage debtors to come up with one that is 
acceptable to all the parties. 
6.2.10.6 Binding Dissenting Creditors ('Cram-Down') 262 
In order to ensure that a business rescue proposal is successfully 
implemented, it will probably be necessary to provide a mechanism 
whereby minority dissenting creditors can be bound by the business 
rescue plan. This is known in business rescue parlance as a 'cram-down' 
provision. This aspect will, of course, be affected by the majority that will 
be required in order to accept the proposed plan in the first place. From 
this it follows that safety features will have to be built into the provisions 
261 Idem in pars 530-1.
 
262 Idem in par 532.
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to allow dissenting creditors to protect their interests, and to ensure that 
their rights are not unfairly affected. How (and in what circumstances) a 
cram-down should be provided for, will be one of the more problematic 
aspects to consider when designing a new business rescue model. 
6.2.10.7 Confirmation of the Plan263 
One question that does arise is whether the plan that has been accepted 
in the requisite manner by creditors, needs to be confirmed by another 
authority (for example, the court) before it can be implemented. Such a 
procedure may prove to be costly and time consuming, and it is suggested 
that this should be avoided if at all possible. It is submitted that if the 
plan is contained in some form of deed of arrangement and has been 
properly executed by the debtor and the business administrator, it should 
be unnecessary to obtain alternative or additional confirmation of the 
plan. 
In addition, a provision probably needs to built in to the procedure to 
prevent any of the parties to the business rescue plan from bringing an 
application to liquidate the debtor as long as the terms of the plan are 
being adhered to. Also, provision will have to be made for procedures 
where the plan is not adhered to by either the business administrator or 
the debtor. One option would be to include provisions that allow for the 
plan to be modified after acceptance if it is found to be flawed as regards 
its practical implementation. 
6.2.10.8 Implementation of the Plan 264 
A question that arises when dealing with the implementation of the 
business rescue plan, is whether this should be done by the business 
administrator that designed and proposed the plan, or whether it should be 
implemented by some other independent person? This will of course 
depend on whether the business rescue procedure comes to an end at the 
time the plan is accepted and executed, or whether the procedure only 
comes to an end once the business rescue plan has been fully implemented. 
If the business rescue procedure comes to an end once the plan has been 
accepted and set in motion, it may be a good idea that someone other than 
the business administrator oversees the process of implementation. In such 
a case the creditors could nominate someone to implement the plan, and 
provision for this could be made in the plan itself.. 
6.2.10.9 Other Issues of Importance 
Although not discussed in any detail in this article, the following 
important questions will also have to receive the necessary attention when 
drafting the provisions relating to the business rescue plan: 
263 Idem in par 533-9.
 
264 Idem in par 545.
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•	 Will the plan have to be accepted by equity holders as well? 
•	 How will challenges to the approval of a plan be dealt with? 
•	 What happens when the implementation of a plan fails? and 
•	 How should a conversion (if any) to liquidation be dealt with? 
6.2.11 Treatment of Creditor Claims 265 
The treatment of creditor claims relates to two important aspects of a 
business rescue model, namely the voting by creditors on the acceptance 
of a plan and the distribution that will ultimately be made to the 
creditors. In this regard the following questions come to mind: 
•	 What procedures will be followed for the submission, verification and 
admission or rejection of claims? 
•	 Are all creditors allowed to submit claims, including those that have 
contingent and unliquidated claims? 
•	 Will there be any claims that cannot be submitted in any circumstances 
(for example personal injury claims and foreign tax claims)? 
•	 At what stage of the proceedings should claims be lodged? 
•	 What happens when creditors fail to submit claims? and 
•	 What procedures should be followed when claims are disputed? 
These are but some of the issues that may arise when dealing with the 
admission of creditors' claims. As a point of departure it is suggested that 
the current insolvency procedures should, as far as is practically possible, 
at least apply to the submission, admission and rejection of claims, 
although the inclusion of creditors with contingent claims and 
unliquidated claims may need to be dealt with another way in a business 
rescue scenario. 
6.2.12 Statutory Preferences (Priorities) and Distribution Rules 266 
Although statutory preferences and distribution rules relate more to 
liquidation than business rescue proceedings.f'" one aspect of this topic 
that does deserve a mention here is the possible subordination of claims. 
It may become necessary to provide for the subordination of claims in the 
business rescue context, especially when the business administrator needs 
to obtain finance in order to continue running the business after the 
business rescue proceeding has commenced. In such a case it may be 
necessary to make provision for the subordination of claims in order to 
make sufficient funds available with which to pay the new lender. This is 
not a new concept in the South African context, as s 435 of the 
Companies Act makes provision for the subordination of claims for the 
purposes of judicial management. 
265	 Idem in pars 566-612 for a detailed discussion of this aspect. 
266	 Idem in pars 613-42. 
267 It is accepted that the priority and ranking of claims in a business rescue context will be 
dealt with as part of the proposed business rescue plan. 
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6.2.13 Discharge of Debts and Claims 268 
In order to ensure that a debtor which has been subject to a business 
rescue regime has the best possible chance of succeeding, provision can be 
made for a formal discharge of claims and debts that existed prior to the 
time the business rescue procedure was commenced. "The principle of a 
discharge may be of particular importance in ensuring that the provisions 
of the plan will be complied with by creditors who rejected the plan, or by 
those who did not participate in the process. A discharge therefore 
establishes 'unequivocally that the plan fully addresses the legal rights of 
credi tors' .269 
The only remaining issue here is at what stage the discharge will take 
effect. This could either be at the time the plan is approved (whether it be 
by the court or the creditors, or both) or at the time the plan has been 
fully implemented. 
6.2.14 Conclusion of Proceedings 
Although this topic was briefly referred to above, the question does 
arise as to when the business rescue proceeding comes to a conclusion. 
Some jurisdictions provide that the business rescue proceedings come to a 
close as soon as the plan has been approved (and confirmed, where 
necessary), while others provide that the proceedings only terminate 
where the liabilities have been discharged in accordance with the plan and 
the plan has otherwise been implemented in full. 
7 Conclusion 
In this article an attempt has been made at illustrating the many facets 
that need to be considered when developing a modern and effective 
business rescue model for South Africa. Assuming that a new business 
rescue model will eventually be introduced, it is clear that a lot of work 
and consultation will be needed before such a model can be implemented. 
There are many stakeholders in the insolvency industry, including 
creditors, employees, equity holders, directors of companies, members of 
close corporations, credit and consumer protection organisations, the 
insolvency profession, business administrators, the Masters of the High 
Court, the bench, the bar, the side-bar and various government 
departments. For this reason it is imperative that the development of a 
new business rescue model be undertaken with the requisite skill, care and 
consultation. 
South Africa's insolvency laws largely comply with the international 
benchmarks laid down by the World Bank and the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), with the 
268 Idem in pars 665-6. 
269 Idem in par 665. 
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notable exception of a modern and effective business rescue regime. By 
developing a modern and effective business rescue regime, it is submitted 
that South Africa will be removing another barrier to the attraction of 
foreign investment. In addition to this, the socio-economic reality in 
South Africa dictates that businesses should be saved where possible, not 
only for the benefit of the economy, but also for the benefit of the 
employees who stand to lose their livelihood as a result of the liquidation 
of the debtors that employ them. 
One can but hope that the government departments that are 
responsible for the development and implementation of a new business 
rescue model will take the necessary steps to bring about this important 
change to South Africa's insolvency laws, something that should happen 
sooner rather than later. 
